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Abstract
This paper shows why members of an organization often share similar beliefs. I argue
that there are two mechanisms. First, when performance depends on making correct
decisions, people prefer to work with others who share their beliefs and assumptions,
since such others ‘will do the right thing’. Second, beliefs will converge over time
through shared learning.
While such homogeneity reduces agency problems, it does so at a cost. I show
that, from an outsider’s perspective, firms invest on average too much in homogeneity.
The theory further predicts that homogeneity will be strongest in successful and older
firms where employees make important decisions. Within a firm, homogeneity will be
stronger among more important employees. Homogeneity will also be path-dependent,
making managers more selective on early hires.
Since shared beliefs are an important aspect of corporate culture (Schein 1985,
Kotter and Heskett 1992), I finally show that the model matches some observations
on corporate culture, such as the influence of a manager on her firm’s culture and
the persistence of culture in the face of turnover. A fundamental difference from
earlier economic theories of corporate culture is that I show that culture, instead of
being created for its own good, can be a side-effect of other purposeful actions. As a
consequence, there can be too much culture in firms.
1 Introduction
Members of the same organization often share similar beliefs. Apple employees, for example,
will think more like other Apple employees than like Microsoft employees. (Or consider the
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notion of a Chicago economist!)1 Such shared beliefs have important implications. In par-
ticular, Van den Steen (2004a) shows that shared beliefs reduce agency problems, thereby
increasing delegation, reducing monitoring and influence activities, and facilitating coordi-
nation. On the other hand, they also reduce the incentives to collect information and can
lead to inertia. Unsurprisingly, shared beliefs have received considerable attention in the
management literature (under the heading of ‘corporate culture’) as I discuss below.
In this paper, I argue that, in a world with differing priors, organizations have an in-
nate tendency to develop homogenous beliefs through two general mechanisms. First, when
performance depends on correct decisions (rather than personal effort), people in an organi-
zation prefer to work with others who have beliefs that are similar to their own, since such
others ‘will do the right thing’ from their perspective. This gives rise to sorting. Second,
employees experience first-hand their firm’s behavior and performance, which is an impor-
tant source of learning. Since all employees of one firm learn from the same source, their
beliefs will converge over time. Shared experiences thus also lead to shared beliefs.
I then show that firms invest on average too much in homogeneity from the perspective of
an outsider, such as a social planner or a shareholder. This is because players fundamentally
believe that they are right and thus value similarity in itself, independent of its objective
benefits and costs. From the perspective of an outsider, such investments in homogeneity
result in a largely unproductive reshuﬄing of people. This result illustrates something unique
to differing priors: the fact that subjective and objective efficiency can be directly at odds
with each other.2
In terms of comparative statics, I show that homogeneity will be stronger in firms that
are older and more successful, in firms where employees make more important decisions,
and in firms where the manager has stronger beliefs. Moreover, within a firm, homogeneity
will be stronger among more important employees. When candidate-employees can self-sort,
homogeneity will also be path-dependent: the fact that current employees are similar to the
manager will cause future hires to be more similar to the manager. As a consequence, the
manager will be more selective for earlier hires and will care about the sequence in which
employees are hired, often preferring to hire the more important employees first.
Shared beliefs are often considered an important aspect of corporate culture (Donaldson
and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992). The mechanisms in this paper
indeed match some key observations on corporate culture. I show, in particular, that a
manager has a considerable influence on her firm’s shared beliefs, and that those shared
beliefs may persist even after all the original members of the firm have left. An important
mechanism in both results is forced learning, i.e., the fact that it is the manager, rather than
the employees themselves, who chooses the experiments from which the employees learn. I
show that such forced learning allows one player to shape another player’s future actions. I
finally show that strong performance creates a strong culture and that the ensuing correlation
may give the incorrect impression that strong culture improves performance, as has been
1Johnson&Johnson even has its ‘Credo’ that describes its (official) shared beliefs. While there is anecdotal
and case-based evidence of shared beliefs (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985), systematic empirical
evidence is lacking.
2As discussed in section 3, subjective efficiency uses each player’s own beliefs to determine his or her
expected utility, while objective efficiency uses one ‘reference belief’ for all players.
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suggested by studies based on informal observations (Deal and Kennedy 1982, Peters and
Waterman 1982).
I derive these results in the context of a firm with a manager and a group of employees,
who all have to choose actions that affect the firm’s payoff, and who all care about these
firm profits. The players openly disagree on what actions are likely to improve the firm’s
profits. I study both the hiring process, which leads to sorting, and how these participants
later learn from the firm’s actions and outcomes.
Literature The importance of homogeneity has been explicit or implicit in the agency
literature (Crawford and Sobel 1982, Cre´mer 1993, Aghion and Tirole 1997, Dessein 2002).
Van den Steen (2004a) summarizes these costs and benefits of homogeneity more systemat-
ically, and derives some new elements. This literature, however, has taken homogeneity as
exogenously determined and only studied how a given level of homogeneity affects agency
problems.
Homogeneity as an endogenous outcome (of sorting) has been derived independently
by Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Van den Steen (2001, 2005b). Besley and Ghatak (2005)
study the effect of ‘mission’, defined as a private benefit from a particular course of action by
the firm, while Van den Steen (2001, 2005b) studies the effect of ‘vision’, defined as (strong)
managerial beliefs about the right course of action by the firm. Both show that employees
will sort towards firms with a manager who has beliefs or private benefits that are similar
to their own, and that such sorting can lead to higher effort levels. Van den Steen (2001,
2005b) shows that it can be optimal to hire a manager who is overconfident and considers
the implications for coordination, while Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that incentives will
be lower after matching. Neither analysis, however, is focused on homogeneity per se, which
is the subject of this paper. As a consequence, neither paper considers comparative statics,
the efficient level of homogeneity, other homogeneity-inducing mechanisms, or implications
for corporate culture.
As mentioned earlier, homogeneity in beliefs has also been discussed in the management
literature under the heading of corporate culture (Burns and Stalker 1961, Baker 1980,
Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992). I will discuss both this
and the economic literature on corporate culture (Kreps 1990, Cre´mer 1993, Lazear 1995,
Carrillo and Gromb 1999, Hermalin 2001, Rob and Zemsky 2002) in section 5. As I will
discuss there, this paper differs from that literature by its focus on the origin of culture and
by the fact that it does not start from the premise that culture is created on purpose for its
own benefits, but can instead be an unintended consequence of other purposeful action.
The key contributions of this paper are then to identify two key sources of organizational
homogeneity, to derive from these a set of conditions under which homogeneity will be strong,
and to show that organizations will invest too much in homogeneity. The importance of these
results derives from the effects of homogeneity on agency problems, and its relationship to
corporate culture.
The next section considers the sorting model. Section 3 shows that organizations invest
too much in homogeneity. Section 4 extends the basic model to consider learning, showing
both that most of the sorting results also obtain by pure learning and that some new results
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obtain. Section 5 discusses implications for corporate culture while section 6 concludes. The
appendices contain a general homogeneity result and further sorting and learning results.
2 Sorting
The most obvious source of homogeneity is sorting in the hiring process. Appendix A shows
in a very general model that, when performance depends on correct decisions rather than
personal effort, people prefer to work with others who have beliefs that are similar to their
own. The reason is that such others ‘make the right decisions’. It is therefore subjectively
efficient for people with similar beliefs to seek each other out when forming organizations.
Nearly any process of hiring or matching will then lead to homogenous organizations.
This section studies this source of homogeneity in more detail. To derive comparative
statics and to study efficiency, I need to impose more structure than the model in appendix A.
I will focus, in particular, on a setting in which a principal hires agents for a project. To take
into account the cost of sorting, I consider an explicit extensive-game form for the hiring
process rather than an axiomatic matching solution.
2.1 Model
Consider a project with a manager M (denoted as player 0) and two employees E1 and E2
(denoted as players 1 and 2). As part of the project, each player i has to choose a course of
action a˜i from the set {X, Y }, with respective payoffs ρX , ρY . The overall project payoff is
a weighted sum of the individual payoffs, minus some cost d discussed below:
R =
2∑
i=0
αiρa˜i − d
where αi denotes the contribution of player i’s payoff. While the values of ρX and ρY are
unknown, each player has his or her own subjective beliefs. Let rX,i and rY,i denote the
expected values of ρX and ρY according to player i. It is common knowledge that players have
differing priors, i.e., r·,i and r·,j may differ even though no player has private information.3
Each player tries to maximize the project’s total payoff R.4
3Differing priors do not contradict the economic paradigm: while rational agents should use Bayes’ rule to
update their prior with new information, nothing is said about those priors themselves, which are primitives
of the model. In particular, absent any relevant information agents have no rational basis to agree on a
prior. Harsanyi (1968) observed that ‘by the very nature of subjective probabilities, even if two individuals
have exactly the same information and are at exactly the same high level of intelligence, they may very well
assign different subjective probabilities to the very same events’. For a more extensive discussion, see Morris
(1995) or Van den Steen (2005a).
4This employees’ objective can be endogenized by extending the model to allow for contracting, while
limiting what can be contracted upon. One approach is to assume that the project is either a success or
failure (with respective payoffs 1 and 0), that
∑2
i=0 αiρa˜i is the probability of success, that the only thing
that is contractible is whether the project is a success or not, and that a player can (and weakly prefers to)
refuse to make a decision, causing a sure failure for the project. Since such extension only complicates the
model and the analysis, I simply impose the players’ final objective as an assumption.
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1Hiring
a Cost c gets drawn from U [0, C].
b Manager hires E1 (see below).
c Manager hires E2 (see below).
2
Actions
Each player i chooses action a˜i
from {X,Y }.
3
Payoff
Project payoffs are realized.
a. Timeline of overall game
i
Candidate selection
One candidate gets drawn from
the set of candidates L.
ii
Learning beliefs
Manager decides whether to
learn the candidate’s preferred
action, at cost c to the project.
iii
Hiring decision
Manager decides whether to
hire this candidate (and move
to Ei+1 or period 2) or not
(and go back to step i).
b. Timeline of hiring Ei
Figure 1: Timeline
Figure 1a shows the timeline of the game. Period 1 is the hiring process, which I discuss
below. In period 2, players choose their actions. In period 3, the project payoffs are realized.
Consider now the hiring process, shown in figure 1b. A candidate for the first position gets
drawn at random from an infinite set of potential candidates L. Empirically, the beliefs of the
potential candidates are independently and identically distributed ra,i
i.i.d.∼ F for a ∈ {X,Y }
and i ∈ L, with F some non-degenerate distribution with support S ⊆ R. For the analysis
in this section, only the difference ∆i = |rX,i − rY,i| will matter. Note that this difference
measures the strength of the manager’s belief, i.e., how strongly she believes that one action
is better than the other. After the candidate and his beliefs are drawn, the manager can
learn, at a cost c to the project, what action is optimal according to this particular candidate.
This cost c gets drawn from a uniform distribution U [0, C] at the very start of the game. The
manager then decides whether to hire this candidate or draw a new one. Once an employee
is hired, the process moves either to the next employee position or to period 2 of the overall
game. Note that hiring is position-specific and that the manager cannot go back to earlier
candidates. When necessary, I will assume that the empirical distribution of managerial
beliefs is identical to that of the candidates, i.e., it is as if the manager is drawn from L prior
to the game.
I will use throughout the following notation: mi =
rX,i+rY,i
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, mi = max(rX,i, rY,i), and
mi = min(rX,i, rY,i). To simplify the statement of the propositions, I will also assume that
the employees’ contributions to the firm’s performance α1, α2 > 0.
2.2 Shared Beliefs
Since the manager’s payoff depends on her employees’ actions, she will want to hire employees
who make the ‘right’ decisions from her perspective, i.e., who share her beliefs.5 Since the
5An obvious issue is whether it wouldn’t be more effective to sort on people who like to work hard, than
to sort on people who have specific beliefs? While all firms have identical preferences over people who work
5
two employees are then each similar to the manager, they will also be similar to each other.
Firms will thus be more homogenous than society at large.
To formally study this idea, let me define the homogeneity of some group by the likelihood
that two randomly selected members of that group agree on the best action. In other words,
the homogeneity of a group G, with members indexed 1 through J , is defined as
H(G) =
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈G,j 6=i Iaˆi=aˆj
J(J − 1)
where I is the indicator function and aˆi is the action that i considers best. A nice aspect
of this measure is that it directly relates to the probability that two randomly selected
members will do the same thing and thus to ‘the way we do things around here’ (which is
one manifestation of corporate culture). Furthermore, Van den Steen (2004a) shows that this
is the right measure to characterize, for example, the effect of homogeneity on monitoring
and delegation among members of the group G. Van den Steen (2004b) shows that measures
of homogeneity based on a distance function give qualitatively the same results.
Using this measure of homogeneity, the following proposition then says that the firm’s
employees will be on average more homogenous than the population of candidates L. Let
Z = {E1, E2} denote the set of employees, and remember that ∆0 = |rX,0 − rY,0| denotes
how strongly the manager (player 0) believes one action is better than the other.
Proposition 1 E[H(Z)] ≥ E[H(L)] with strict inequality when ∆0 > 0.
Proof : Since the payoffs from the two employees are additively separable, I can study them
completely separately. Consider thus the hiring of one particular employee Ei. Following the
traditional analysis for a search game, there are two possible equilibria. Either M never learns the
candidate’s beliefs and simply hires the first candidate. She then expects a payoff from employee
Ei of E[Ri] = E[αiρa˜i ] = αim0. Alternatively, M always learns the candidate’s beliefs and hires a
candidate only if that candidate agrees withM on the best action. In that case,M expects a payoff
of E[Ri] = αim0 − 2c, where I use the fact that if a trial costs c and succeeds with probability θ,
then the average cost to succeed is cθ . It follows that aˆi = aˆ0 when αi(m0−m0) ≥ 2c or αi∆0 ≥ 4c,
and aˆi equals X and Y with equal probability otherwise.
Taking now the results for E1 and E2 together, it follows further that, with α = min(α1, α2),
E[H(Z)] =
∫ min(α∆0
4
,C)
0
1
C
du+
∫ C
min(
α∆0
4
,C)
1
2C
du =
1
2
+min
(
α∆0
8C
,
1
2
)
(1)
which is larger than E[H(L)] = 12 and strictly so when ∆0 > 0. This proves the proposition. ¥
The proof follows the suggested intuition: if c is sufficiently low, then M sorts on her beliefs.
Sorting makes both employees choose the same action as M and thus the same action as
each other.
hard, different firms will typically prefer people with different beliefs. As a consequence, ‘working hard’ will
be reflected in the wage, while ‘having the right beliefs’ typically not. The distinction is similar to that
between vertical and horizontal differentiation in product markets.
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Although systematic empirical evidence is lacking, there is both anecdotal and case-based
evidence that managers do hire employees with similar beliefs (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983,
Schein 1985).6 This is further supported by the observation that firms spend considerable
resources on personal interviews and give them a lot of weight, despite the fact that the avail-
able evidence implies that personal interviews have very low validity to assess a candidate’s
ability, and only allow to assess a candidate’s ‘fit’ (Arvey and Campion 1982).
2.3 Determinants of homogeneity
If firms are more homogenous than society at large, which firms will be most homogenous?
To answer this, let ∆0 = |rX,0 − rY,0| denote again the strength of the manager’s belief,
i.e., how strongly she prefers one action over the other. The following proposition then says
that homogeneity will be stronger in firms where employees make important decisions, where
the manager has strong beliefs, and where sorting is cheap.
Proposition 2a E[H(Z)] increases in α1, α2, and ∆0, and decreases in C.
Proof : Following equation 1 in the proof of proposition 1, E[H(Z)] decreases (weakly, and in
part of the parameter space strictly) in C and increases (weakly, and in part of the parameter space
strictly) in ∆0 and α. Since α = min(α1, α2), it, and thus E[H(Z)], increases in α1 and α2.7 ¥
Consider first the result that E[H(Z)] increases in α1 and α2. Remember that αi denotes the
contribution of player i’s actions to the overall result. This captures both how many decisions
the player controls and how important each of these decisions is to the firm’s success. The
intuition for this comparative static is that employees who make more, and more important,
decisions have a larger impact on the manager’s utility, increasing her gain from sorting, and
thus making the manager more selective. Since each employee is then more similar to the
manager, employees are also more similar to each other. The empirical implication is that
consulting firms or advertising firms, where employees typically make many and important
decisions, will be more homogenous (on relevant dimensions) than an assembly plant where
employees just execute pre-specified tasks.
The effect of ∆0 comes from the fact that a manager with more pronounced beliefs cares
more about what an employee does, which makes her more selective. This result captures
the observation that firms with a clear set of shared beliefs were often founded by a manager
with strong beliefs (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983).
The comparative static on C, finally, predicts that homogeneity will be stronger along
belief dimensions that are easier to observe through behavior or through other visible signs.
A small variation on proposition 2a says that, within a firm, homogeneity will be stronger
among employees who make more important decisions. To see this, consider a firm with J
6There is systematic evidence that firms hire people who fit their firm’s ‘organizational values’ (Meglino,
Ravlin, and Adkins 1989, Chatman 1991, Judge and Bretz 1992, Cable and Judge 1997), but since such
‘organizational values’ are typically very ill-defined in these analyses and cover both beliefs and other things,
it is difficult to match this evidence to the model (or to any formal model, for that matter).
7The fact that E[H(Z)] depends on α (instead of directly on α1 and α2) contains no useful economics:
it is simply caused by the fact that the cost c is the same for E1 and E2. If that cost were position-specific
then E[H(Z)] would depend directly on both α1 and α2.
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employees, and let Z = {E1, . . . , EJ}. The following proposition says that subsets of the
firm that consist of more important employees will be more homogenous.
Proposition 2b For any subset z ⊂ Z with 2 or more employees, E[H(z)] increases in αi
for i ∈ z.
Proof : This follows from the proof of proposition 2a. ¥
Given that αi captures both the number of decisions that i controls and the importance
of each of these decisions, this predicts that management will be more homogenous than
rank-and-file employees, and that employees in the ‘core’ activities of the firm will be more
homogenous than those in peripheral units. In professional firms, for example, the pro-
fessional staff will be more homogenous than the support staff. Homogeneity will also be
stronger among product designers, whose decisions have an important influence on firm
success, than in the accounts payable department, which performs a purely routine function.
2.4 Self-sorting
While the above analysis focuses exclusively on sorting of potential employees by the man-
ager, self-sorting by the potential employees themselves is an equally important phenomenon.
In particular, since employees’ utility depends on the actions and beliefs of their manager and
colleagues, some people may prefer not to work for a specific firm.8 Especially in firms with
a strong set of beliefs, such self-sorting seems to be quite prevalent (Collins and Porras 1994).
Self-sorting has a number of interesting implications. In this section, I will show the
following two things. First, beliefs will be path-dependent in the sense that the first hire
having beliefs that are similar to those of the manager increases the likelihood that the second
hire will also be similar to the manager. Second, the manager will be more selective on earlier
employees than on later employees and will want to hire the more important employees first.
To study these issues formally, I extend the earlier model with an outside option for the
employees. In particular, each potential candidate k has an outside options in which he
gets, with respective probabilities β and 1 − β, the payoffs of his most and least preferred
actions, mk and mk. The probability β is a random variable, β ∼ U [ 0, 1 ], that gets drawn
publicly at the start of the game simultaneously with c. The candidates can exercise their
outside option at any point in time, but have a lexicographic preference to exercise the option
earlier. Moreover, all potential candidates can observe the preferred actions of already hired
employees. To simplify the analysis, I assume that α0 = 0, ∆0 < C, and that employees
observe β but not c. Only those candidates who have not yet exercised their outside option
can be considered for a position. Assume finally that the manager can choose, prior to
learning c and β, in which sequence to fill positions.
The following proposition then says that the manager will hire first the important em-
ployees and will, even for equally important employees, be more selective on these early hires.
Moreover, there is path-dependence: the first hire being similar to the manager makes the
8Note that even when an employee’s utility depends only on the outcome of his own actions, he may still
care about the beliefs of his manager and colleagues. This is because the manager or colleagues can often
influence the employee’s actions through social norms, a need for coordination, or implicit authority.
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second hire more likely to be similar to the manager. Remember that aˆi denotes the action
that i considers best.
Proposition 3 In any equilibrium, α1 ≥ α2. Moreover, M is strictly more likely to sort on
E1 than on E2 (even when α1 = α2). Finally, P [aˆ2 = aˆ0 | aˆ1 = aˆ0] > P [aˆ2 = aˆ0 | aˆ1 6= aˆ0].
Proof : Consider first the hiring of E2 by M . For M , the hiring of E2 is independent of E1.
Let L˜ denote the subset of L that has not yet exercised the outside option, and let θ denote the
likelihood that a randomly drawn candidate from L˜ thinks aˆ0 is best. M will sort when hiring E2
iff α2m0 − cθ ≥ α2(θm0 + (1− θ)m0) or if α2θ(1− θ)∆0 ≥ c.
Consider now the decision of potential candidates to apply for E2. Since α0 = 0, this depends only
on aˆ1. A candidate k with aˆk = aˆ1 gets payoff mk ≥ βmk +(1− β)mk upon getting hired, and will
thus always apply (since he might get hired independent of his beliefs if c, which is unknown to
him, is very high). A candidate with aˆk 6= aˆ1 gets payoff α1mk + α2mk upon getting hired, which
is larger than his outside option when α2 ≥ β. It follows that
1. for α2 < β, there is perfect self-sorting by E2, but no sorting by M (since θ is either 0 or 1).
2. for α2 ≥ β and α2 ≥ 4c∆0 , there is no self-sorting (so that θ = .5), but perfect sorting.
3. for β ≤ α2 ≤ 4c∆0 , there is neither self-sorting nor sorting.
Consider next the hiring of E1. Since E1 candidates do not observe the manager’s preferences, any
self-sorting will affect X-types and Y -types in symmetric ways, so that now θ = .5. In case 1 (for
E2), the manager will sort on E1 if m0 − 2c ≥ m0 or if ∆0 ≥ 4c. In case 2, the manager will sort
on E1 if α1m0 − 2c ≥ α1m0 or α1∆0 ≥ 4c. In case 3, the manager will again sort if α1∆0 ≥ 4c.
Note now that the sequence of E1 and E2 only matters for whether or not the project ends up in
case 1. Since case 1 is (weakly) better than either 2 or 3, M prefers α1 > α2, and will thus choose
to hire first for the position with the larger α. This proves the first part of the proposition. This,
together with the sorting rules above, implies the second part and, together with the fact that there
is perfect self-sorting by E2 when α2 < β, also the last part. ¥
Intuitively, once the firm hired E1, it becomes more attractive to potential candidates who
agree with E1. Such self-sorting can be very attractive to the manager, since it allows her
to get the ‘right’ employees without spending time and money on sorting. Since important
employees cause more self-sorting (because they have more impact on the outcome), the
manager prefers to hire the more important employee first. If she makes sure that this first
employee is of the right type, then she can let self-sorting do the rest. This makes, on its
turn, the manager more selective for the first position.
The interaction between sorting and self-sorting is ambiguous, however. On the one hand,
self-sorting makes sorting more effective, since the likelihood of getting a good type upon
rejecting a bad type is high. On the other hand, self-sorting makes sorting less necessary
(or useful), since self-sorting itself improves the base rate of candidates. The second effect
dominates in the current setup, so that sorting and self-sorting are mutually exclusive, but
other settings may give different results. While the exact results of this proposition may thus
not always obtain, the facts that self-sorting increases homogeneity, that it introduces path-
dependence, and that it makes the manager care about the sequence in which employees are
hired, seem to be robust.
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Two remarks are in order. First, self-sorting may actually be more powerful than sorting
by the manager. It seems, in particular, easier for a new candidate to get a sense for
the organization than it is for the organization to look into the mind of the candidate.
Second, much self-sorting actually takes place through turnover during the early stages of
employment. As a consequence, self-sorting can also be quite costly, since much of the
match-specific investments get made in exactly that period.
3 Overinvestment in Homogeneity
Given that both sorting and self-sorting can be very expensive, do organizations end up
with the right level of homogeneity? I will argue here that organizations actually invest
on average too much in homogeneity from an outsider’s perspective. The reason is that
the manager cares about homogeneity for its own good, since she fundamentally believes
that she is right and thus that people who think like her will make better decisions. The
manager will therefore spend resources on sorting that from the perspective of an outsider,
who may disagree with the manager, deliver on average little more than an unproductive
rearrangement of people.
To state this result formally, let me first clarify the different approaches to efficiency
in a world with differing priors. In particular, the presence of multiple priors raises the
question what the right prior belief is to determine the efficiency of an allocation. There are
fundamentally two approaches, that each have their own use. The first approach, which I
call ‘subjective efficiency’, measures each person’s utility using his or her own prior belief.
In this subjective sense, one allocation is more efficient than another if each player considers
him- or herself at least as well off (and some strictly better off) under the first allocation
than under the second. This notion of efficiency is most useful for positive analysis. It is the
efficiency of the first welfare theorem and of the Coase Theorem.9
The second approach, which I call ‘objective efficiency’, measures everyone’s utility using
the same ‘reference belief’, which is the belief of the social planner, the academic observer,
or the overall principal, and which is for some reason considered to be the ‘right’ prior.
This objective approach is most useful for normative analysis, and I will use it here since it
captures how shareholders and academic researchers will evaluate organizational behavior.
This objective efficiency, however, can be sensitive to the belief that is chosen as reference
belief. One possible approach, that I will use here, is to try to show that a certain efficiency
ranking holds for any possible choice of reference belief. An alternative approach would be
to draw the reference belief from some distribution and then take expectations over this
distribution.
So I want to determine whether the organization invests too much, too little, or just
enough in homogeneity. The approach I take here is to study whether a social planner would
want to change, on average over all possible managers, the managers’ incentives to sort. In
9For example, in a pure exchange economy where differences in utilities are, in part, due to differing
priors, the first and second welfare theorem only hold if Pareto-efficiency is meant as ‘subjective efficiency’
in the sense above. The welfare theorems typically do not hold for ‘objective efficiency’, defined below, as
long as there are differing priors along relevant dimensions.
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particular, assume that the social planner can subsidize or tax the managers’ cost of sorting,
making it γc instead of c, and then compensate the organization by making a lump-sum
transfer in the amount of the expected subsidy or tax. Would the social planner choose
γ = 1, which means that the manager has on average the right incentives, or not?
I will show here that any social planner with any set of reference beliefs would choose γ >
1 since he thinks that the manager invests on average too much in sorting. As I mentioned
earlier, I will assume here, for simplicity and symmetry, that the empirical distribution of the
manager’s beliefs is as if the manager were also drawn from L, i.e., rX,0, rY,0
i.i.d.∼ F . With γˆ
denoting the social planner’s choice of γ, the following proposition then says that the social
planner wants to tax c to reduce the manager’s incentives to sort.
Proposition 4 For any reference belief ρˆ = (ρˆX , ρˆY ), γˆ > 1.
Proof : Let mˆ = ρˆX+ρˆY2 . Pick some γ and condition on ∆0. When
αi∆0
4γ ≤ C, the organization’s
expected profit from position Ei, denoted Ri, according to the social planner, is
E[Ri] =
∫ αi∆0
4γ
0
(αi
ρˆX + ρˆY
2
− 2γu) 1
C
du+
∫ C
αi∆0
4γ
αimˆ
1
C
du+
∫ αi∆0
4γ
0
2(γ − 1)u 1
C
du
= αimˆ− 1
C
(
αi∆0
4γ
)2
where the last term of the first line is the lump-sum tax refund. This E[Ri] increases in γ. When
αi∆0
4γ > C, E[Ri] is independent of γ. It follows that the unconditional expectation also increases
in γ, so that γˆ > 1, which proves the proposition. ¥
The intuition here is that from an outsider’s perspective, managers are as likely to be right
as to be wrong. The gain from sorting in the first case exactly cancels out the loss from
sorting in the second. The net result are resources spent on sorting, which are lost.
Appendix B.1 shows that this result holds even when the manager has other ways to
control employees’ behavior, such as oversight. In particular, it considers an extension where
the manager can centralize decisions at some cost. Homogenous organizations will then be
more decentralized, so that homogeneity saves on centralization costs. Despite these benefits
of homogeneity, a social planner would still want to impose a tax on sorting in order to reduce
the manager’s incentives to sort.
4 Shared Experience
Once employees are hired, a second homogeneity mechanism kicks in. In particular, em-
ployees experience first-hand the firm’s actions and successes. Such experience will influence
their beliefs.10 Since all employees have the same experiences, their beliefs will converge
10Recall that the assumption of differing priors by no means rules out the employees’ use of Bayes’ rule to
update their beliefs as they accumulate experience. To the contrary, employees are Bayes-rational in exactly
the usual way.
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even though they begin with differing priors. In other words, shared experiences breed
shared beliefs.
Since employees of different firms will have different experiences, however, and since first-
hand experiences are difficult to communicate,11 beliefs will converge within firms but not
(or less so) across firms. So there will be more within-firm homogeneity than across-firm
homogeneity.
I will study here both the mechanism and the comparative statics of homogeneity through
shared experiences, using a slight modification of the model of section 2 to allow for learn-
ing. After extending the basic homogeneity result to this context, I show that most of the
comparative statics of sorting also extend if the manager can affect the employees’ learning.
Under that condition, I also derive an important new comparative static: successful firms
will be more homogenous.
4.1 Model
The model in this section makes a few small modifications to the model of section 2 to allow
agents to learn from the firm’s experience. Assume, in particular, that the manager chooses
her action first, before the employees do, and that the employees observe the manager’s
action and payoff. Since the employees will now learn from the performance of M ’s action,
the empirical distribution of the ρa will play a role. For simplicity and symmetry, assume
that the true returns are empirically distributed like the prior beliefs: ρa
i.i.d.∼ F . Note that the
latter is not a prior distribution but an empirical distribution of the agents’ differing priors,
which is introduced for the sole purpose of the analysis.12 To consider the pure learning case,
assume finally that c =∞, so that there is no sorting.
4.2 Shared Beliefs
I first show that the result of proposition 1 extends to this context: employees of the same
firm will have shared beliefs, so that firms are more homogenous than society at large. There
is a small complication since there are two possible reference points: the original labor pool
L (who have not learned from anyone) or the employees of other firms (who have learned,
but from other managers). In what follows, I will consider both.
Let Z = {E1, E2} again denote the set of employees. The following proposition says that
homogeneity is higher among employees than among the candidates.
Proposition 1′a E[H(Z)] > E[H(L)]
11The idea that first-hand experience is difficult to match is, for example, captured in the old saying ‘Tell
me and I will forget; Show me and I will remember; Involve me and I will understand’ (variously attributed
to Confucius, Aristoteles, and one of my former teacher’s uncles).
12There is also an implicit assumption, to make sure the model is consistent, that either i’s prior belief
about ρa has the same support as F , or that a zero-probability belief can be revised upon an observation
that contradicts it.
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Proof : Denoting the manager’s outcome as x, the probability that E1 and E2 agree on the
optimal course of action is F (x)2 + [1− F (x)]2 so that
E[H(Z)] =
∫
x
F (u)2 + [1− F (u)]2 dF (u) =
∫ 1
0
v2 +
[
1− 2v + v2] dv = 2
3
>
1
2
= E[H(L)]
¥
Note that shared experience creates homogeneity in two ways, which are more or less op-
posites. On the one hand, if the experience was good, then each employee is more likely to
undertake that particular action, which increases the likelihood that two employees will agree
on that action being the optimal course of action. On the other hand, if the experience was
bad, then each employee is less likely to undertake that particular action, which increases
the likelihood that they will agree on the other action.
As mentioned above, an alternative reference point is to compare within-firm homogeneity
to across-firm homogeneity. To that purpose, consider two firms, f and g, which each have
a manager and two employees. Let Ei,h denote employee i of firm h. The two firms are
completely identical except for the identity of managers and employees, who are all randomly
drawn from L. The employees of a firm observe the actions and outcomes of their own
manager, but not those of the other manager. Let Zs = (E1,h, E2,h) denote two employees of
the same firm and Zd = (Ei,f , Ej,g), where possibly i = j, denote two employees of different
firms. The following proposition then says that employees of the same firm are more likely
to agree than employees of different firms.
Proposition 1′b E[H(Zs)] > E[H(Zd)]
Proof : The proof of proposition 1′a implies E[H(Zs)] = 2/3. Consider then two employees of
different firms. If their managers undertake the same action, it is as if they were in the same firm.
If their managers undertake different actions, then (since ρa
i.i.d.∼ F ) they agree with probability 12 .
It follows that E[H(Zd)] =
2
3
+ 1
2
2 < E[H(Zs)] =
2
3 . ¥
4.3 Determinants of Homogeneity
Consider now again the question what determines homogeneity, i.e., under which conditions
firms are more likely to have shared beliefs. The basic learning model of section 4.1 delivers
relatively few comparative statics: appendix B.1 shows, using two small variations on the
model, that homogeneity will be stronger in older firms and when the manager’s experience
is easier to communicate or observe.
Things get substantially more interesting when the manager can affect whether employees
learn from her experience. In particular, I will show that most of the comparative statics of
sorting extend, and that, moreover, successful organizations will be more likely to develop
shared beliefs. In other words, success breeds homogeneity.
To that purpose, assume that an employee learns from the manager’s experience only if
the firm invests in communication (which can also be interpreted as training or socialization).
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In particular, the manager decides at the end of period 1, after learning her payoff, for each
employee whether to communicate the first-period outcome to that employee, at a cost k to
the firm. This cost is a random variable k ∼ U [0, K], drawn at the start of period 1.
For reasons that become clear below, I will now allow players to choose among N ≥ 2
actions. As before, action a’s payoff ρa is unknown, its expected payoff according to i is
distributed according to ra,i
i.i.d.∼ F for i ∈ L, as is its empirical distribution ρa i.i.d.∼ F .
The following proposition says that nearly all comparative statics of proposition 2 extend
to this case.13 In particular, homogeneity will be high when employee decisions are important
and when communication is easy. Moveover, within a firm, homogeneity will be stronger
among more important employees. For the second part of the proposition, assume as before
that there are J employees and Z = {E1, . . . , EJ}.
Proposition 2′ E[H(Z)] increases in α1 and α2, and decreases in K. For any subset z ⊂ Z
with 2 or more employees, E[H(z)] increases in αi for i ∈ z.
Proof : Consider first the manager’s decision to invest in communication. Let A denote the set of
actions, r0 =
∑
a∈A ra,0
N the average payoff according toM , and rˇ0 =
∑
a∈A\{a˜0} ra,0
N−1 the average payoff
according toM of all but her chosen action. If the agent does not get any information about the pay-
off, he takes (from M ’s perspective) a random action, with expected payoff r0.14 If the first-period
payoff is x and the agent does observe that payoff, then he chooses that action with probability
F (x)N−1 and some other action, with expected payoff rˇ0, with complementary probability. It fol-
lows that M ’s expected continuation payoff for Ei is then αi
(
xF (x)N−1 + rˇ0(1− F (x)N−1)
)
. So
M ’s gain from having Ei observe M ’s action and outcome is
Si = αi
(
xF (x)N−1 + rˇ0(1− F (x)N−1)− x
N
− (N − 1)rˇ0
N
)
= αi(x− rˇ0)
(
F (x)N−1 − 1
N
)
.
Since M communicates to Ei iff Si ≥ k, Ei will learn with probability qi(x) = P [Si ≥ k]. Let xˇ be
defined as F (xˇ)N−1 = 1N and let x0 = min(xˇ, rˇ0) and x1 = max(xˇ, rˇ0). Then qi(x) is (semi-strictly)
quasiconvex in x with qi(x) = 0 for x ∈ [x0, x1], and qi(x) increases in αi and decreases in K.
Note that the probability that 2 employees agree is 1N unless both observe the manager’s action
and performance. Let q(x) = mini qi(x), then
E[H(Z)] =
∫
x
(
q(x)
[
F (x)2(N−1) +
1
N − 1
[
1− F (x)N−1]2]+ (1− q(x)) 1
N
)
f(x) dx
=
1
N
+
N
N − 1
∫
x
q(x)
(
F (x)(N−1) − 1
N
)2
dF (x).
This proves the first half of the proposition since q(x) increases in α1 and α2 and decreases in K.
The second half is analogous. ¥
13A result similar to the part of proposition 2a concerning ∆0, the manager’s conviction, seems to hold
(at least in expectation), but requires a reformulation and a lot more machinery in this context.
14When the employee does not observe the first period action and payoff, that fact on itself allows him to
make inferences about x (since it says that it is likely that the manager did not find it worthwhile to invest).
However, since employees’ beliefs are symmetric ex-ante and since the employee doesn’t know what action
the manager took, the employee’s action will still be random from M ’s perspective.
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As with sorting, the intuition is that the manager cares more about employees learning
when these employees make important decisions and when learning is cheap. Investments
to make sure that employees hold the ‘right’ beliefs indirectly generate homogeneity. The
comparative static in K suggests that homogeneity will be stronger in smaller firms.
An analogous proof also shows that E[H(Zs)] − E[H(Zd)] increases in α1 and α2 and
decreases inK. In other words, within-firm homogeneity also increases relative to across-firm
homogeneity when α1 and α2 increase and K decreases.
Consider now the prediction that success breeds homogeneity. Let x denote the payoff
of the manager’s action and assume for simplicity that F has full support. The follow-
ing proposition then says that only the most successful firms will attain a certain level of
homogeneity.15
Proposition 5 For any N > 2, there exist Hˆ and xˆ such that E[H(Z)] > Hˆ if and only if
x > xˆ.
Proof : From the proof of proposition 2′, it follows that for any N , there exist x0 ≤ x1 such
that E[H(Z)]x=x˜ is strictly decreasing in x˜ for x˜ < x0 and strictly increasing for x˜ > x1 with
E[H(Z)]x=x˜ =
1
N
+
N
N − 1q(x˜)
(
F (x˜)(N−1) − 1
N
)2
so that limx˜→∞E[H(Z)]x=x˜ = 1N +
N
N−1(1− 1N )2 = 1 and limx→−∞E[H(Z)]x=x˜ = 1N + NN−1( 1N )2 =
1
N−1 . For any N , let Hˆ =
1
N−1 and let xˆ be defined by
1
N +
N
N−1q(xˆ)(F (xˆ)
(N−1) − 1N )2 = Hˆ for
xˆ > x1. This concludes the proposition. ¥
The intuition is that, for reasons that I’ll explain immediately, extreme experiences generate
agreement on the right course of action, but positive extreme experiences have more effect
than negative extreme experiences. Moreover, the homogeneity effect vanishes for negative
extreme experiences as N increases, which is not the case for positive extreme experiences.
There are actually two effects that generate homogeneity here. First, extreme results will
lead to more agreement even without any extra investments by the manager. In particular,
an extremely high payoff makes it very likely that all employees agree that this is the right
course of action, while an extremely low payoff makes it very likely that all employees agree
that this cannot be the best action, reducing the choice set to N − 1 actions and thus also
increasing the probability of agreement.
The second, and more interesting, effect is that the manager is more likely to invest in
communication when the payoff is extreme. By such investments he tries to make sure that,
if the payoff was high, the employee undertakes that action, or, if the payoff was low, the
employee avoids that action. More communication will increase agreement.
Both these effects are asymmetric in the sense that they are stronger for extremely high
payoffs than for extremely low payoffs. Agreement on what action is best leads directly
to similar actions, while agreement on what action is worst only reduces the choice to the
remaining N − 1 actions. Similarly, the manager gains much more from telling an employee
15Proposition 8 shows that a similar result also holds for the relationship between homogeneity and em-
ployee performance.
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what to do, than from telling him what not to do, since the latter leaves N − 1 actions to
choose from. As a consequence, extreme successes create more homogeneity than extreme
failures.
I discuss an important implication of this result in section 5. In any case, the result
predicts that organizations with very strong past performance will invest more in communi-
cation (or training or socialization).
5 Corporate culture
Since shared beliefs are an important part of corporate culture, I consider here how this
theory relates to the literature on corporate culture, and what it can contribute.
5.1 Corporate Culture as Shared Beliefs
The idea that shared beliefs are a core component of corporate culture goes back at least to
Burns and Stalker (1961) who define corporate culture as ‘a dependable constant system of
shared beliefs.’ Other early contributors, such as Baker (1980), Schwartz and Davis (1981),
Peters and Waterman (1982), or Donaldson and Lorsch (1983), also defined shared beliefs
either as an important component or as the core element of corporate culture. Probably
the most influential and most cited perspective on corporate culture is that of Schein (1984,
1985). He defines culture as having three levels. The most visible, but most superficial, level
is that of culture as a pattern of behavior or ‘visible artifacts’. It is ‘the way things are
done around here,’ the norms, the stories, the symbols. These behavioral patterns reflect
a second, deeper, level of culture, which are the firm’s shared values. Shared values are on
their turn driven by the third and most fundamental level of culture: shared assumptions or
shared beliefs about the world.16
There is also a small but growing economic literature on corporate culture. Within that
literature, Cre´mer (1993) and Lazear (1995) both focus explicitly on this notion of corporate
culture as shared beliefs. Cre´mer (1993) models corporate culture as shared information in
a team-theory model and shows how such shared beliefs improve the alignment of actions.
Lazear (1995) does not model the beliefs or values explicitly, but assumes that they diffuse
like genetic traits and shows that this leads to dynamic and equilibrium properties that fit
many aspects of corporate culture as discussed in the management literature.
Other economic work on corporate culture has focused more on what Schein called the
‘visible artifacts’, such as symbols, convention, myths, and norms. Kreps (1990), as inter-
preted by Hermalin (2001), suggests two ways to think about corporate culture: the selected
equilibrium in a game with multiple equilibria and a reputation for dealing in a specific way
16Note that there are other views on corporate culture in the management literature. Some authors have
focused exclusively on the visible aspects of culture, such as myths, conventions, norms, and symbols. Others
have taken a more post-modernist approach, focusing on ‘ambiguity as the essence of organizational culture’
(Martin 1992). Nevertheless, even Martin (1992) recognizes that the vast majority of the literature interprets
corporate cultures as shared beliefs and values.
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with unforseen contingencies. Both can, in part, be interpreted as implications of under-
lying shared beliefs. For example, Van den Steen (2004a) shows how shared beliefs about
the world make coordination on a particular equilibrium faster, more likely, and more pre-
dictable. Furthermore, a common view of the world should also make reactions to unforseen
contingencies more predictable. Hermalin (2001) gives an in-depth perspective on the exist-
ing economic research on corporate culture, including his important interpretation of Kreps
(1990), and adds to it by linking culture to insights from other fields, such as IO. Along
such lines, Carrillo and Gromb (1999) model corporate culture as production technologies
for which employees can make specific investments. The fact that employees choose their
investments simultaneously, combined with the possibility for the firm to change technology,
can lead to the coexistence of a strong culture (high investment) equilibrium and a weak
culture (low investment) equilibrium. Rob and Zemsky (2002) present a theory in which
firms differ in the stationary levels of cooperation among their employees. They equate this
with corporate culture in the sense of a ‘stable, [. . . ], pattern of behavior’.17
The current paper differs in two key respects from this existing economic literature.
First, I focus completely on the micro-mechanisms that generate ‘culture as shared beliefs’
and make predictions based on those mechanisms. The existing literature, on the contrary,
has either focused on identifying potential benefits of culture or has, starting from different
notions of culture, tried to match specific observations. Second, and less obvious, much of
the existing economic literature on culture, starting with Kreps (1990), implicitly assumes
that management creates a firm’s culture on purpose and for its own good. Based on that
assumption, that literature then identifies the benefits of culture that make it worth in-
vesting in and shows how even optimally chosen culture can have a downside. This paper,
in contrast, shows that homogeneity and culture can be unintended consequence of other
purposeful action: trying to make sure that employees hold the right beliefs or the right
values. This raises the issue whether the level of homogeneity of organizations is actually
appropriate. This approach is consistent with the wider academic debate on corporate cul-
ture. In particular, while early bestsellers made claims that culture in itself would improve
performance (Deal and Kennedy 1982, Peters and Waterman 1982), thereby biasing the early
literature towards explaining the benefits of culture, the lack of systematic evidence on this
claim (Martin 1992) has brought about a more balanced cost-benefit view and a greater focus
on when or what culture is beneficial (Kotter and Heskett 1992). Both this wider academic
literature and the current paper recognize the importance of a strong culture, but they take
no (implicit) position as to whether its effect is positive or negative on balance.
The remainder of this section considers this paper’s implications for an economic theory
of corporate culture. I first show that the mechanisms in this paper match some observations
on corporate culture. I show, in particular, that the manager has an important influence
on her firm’s culture, and that a firm’s culture tends to persist over time, even when all
17A bit further afield, my model is also related to the work of Prescott and Visscher (1980) and could be
extended to overlap with organization capital in their sense. Weber and Camerer (2003) focus on ‘commu-
nication codes’ as an expression of corporate culture and show experimentally that ‘merging’ groups with
different communication codes reduces the joint group’s performance. Finally, the result that culture may
persist in the face of turnover is reminiscent of Tirole (1996), although the two results are about different
things and are also driven by different mechanisms.
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original members of the firm have left. In an earlier working paper (Van den Steen 2004b),
I also showed why different firms may develop different cultures and why cultures may be
suboptimal even when firms have indefinite opportunity to learn from experience.
I then consider this paper’s implications for the link between culture and performance. I
argue, in particular, that strong performance will create a strong culture. The ensuing cor-
relation between culture and performance may be interpreted incorrectly as culture causing
high performance.
5.2 The Manager’s Influence on Culture
To capture the notion of corporate culture as a firm’s shared beliefs, I would like to define a
firm’s culture to be that course of action on which most employees agree as the best course
of action (at the point in time when they have to choose an action). With a limited number
of employees, however, such action may not exist. I will therefore formally define a course
of action ac to be the firm’s culture if the probability that two employees agree on ac as the
best course of action is higher than the probability that they agree on any other particular
action. As the number of employees goes to infinity, this definition almost surely coincides
with the action on which most employees agree as the best course of action.
My first result then is that a firm’s culture is influenced by its manager’s beliefs. I will
show, in particular, that the manager’s action a˜0 is more likely than any other action to
become the firm’s culture (i.e., belief most likely to be shared). In the sorting model, this
is trivial since the manager sorts according to her prior beliefs. The interesting result here
is that it also holds in the pure learning model, despite the fact that the manager’s prior,
which determines a˜0, is completely unrelated to the underlying performance. Consider, in
particular, the basic learning model of section 4.1 but with N ≥ 2. The following proposition
says that a˜0 is more likely than any other action to become the firm’s most shared belief .
Proposition 6 For any a 6= a˜0, P [ac = a˜0] ≥ P [ac = a] with strict inequality for N > 2.
Proof : Let x be the payoff of a˜0. The likelihood that two employees agree on a˜0 as the best action
is
∫
x F (x)
2(N−1) dF (x) = 12N−1 while the likelihood that two employees agree on any particular other
action is
∫
x
[
1−F (x)N−1
N−1
]2
dF (x) = 2N(2N−1) . This proves the proposition. ¥
This result is important since most researchers who identified corporate culture with shared
beliefs have also stressed the role of the founder or early leader in the formation of an
organization’s culture (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Schein 1985, Kotter and Heskett 1992).
5.3 Persistence over time
Closely related to this managerial influence is the phenomenon that culture persists over
time, even when all original members of the organization are gone. This observation makes
organizational culture intriguing: it is as if culture exists independent from the people in the
organization, as if the organization itself has some personality or identity. I will show that
culture is indeed persistent in the models of this paper.
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Persistence is straightforward in an overlapping-generations extension of the sorting
model: managers hire employees in their own image, who on their turn hire the next genera-
tion in the same image, etc. More interesting is again the result that persistence also obtains
in the pure learning model. To that purpose, consider two generations of the learning model
of section 4.1 with N ≥ 2, where an employee of the first generation becomes the manager in
the second generation (and the employees of the second generation are new draws from L).
Denote by a˜0(1) the action of the first-generation manager. I will show that, under reasonable
conditions, the second-generation manager is more likely to undertake a˜0(1) than any other
action, and second-generation employees are more likely to agree on a˜0(1) than on any other
action. In fact, both these results also hold after an arbitrary number of generations in
an overlapping generations model where individuals are employees in their first period, and
managers in their second period, and then die.
This result is quite remarkable, given that the first-generation manager’s prior is com-
pletely independent of the underlying performance and other players’ priors, and given that
the second-generation employees never overlapped with the first-generation manager. It
shows how a player’s actions can be systematically influenced by forced learning, i.e., by
exposing the player to experiments chosen by someone else (rather than by himself).
To analyze this effect formally, consider the model of section 4.1 with N ≥ 2 but repeated
twice. The first of these two stages is exactly the same as specified in section 4.1. After
this first stage, one of the employees gets picked at random to be the second-generation’s
manager. (The other employee disappears from the game.) The second stage is then also
exactly like the model of section 4.1, with the two second-generation employees drawn at
random from L. To eliminate considerations of strategic experimentation (given that players
have been reduced to taking only one action in each role), I will assume here that, with ²→ 0,
player i’s belief about ρa puts probability 1 − ² on ra,i and probability ² on the rest of the
support. As a consequence, each player will in each period simply choose the action with
the highest expected payoff.18 Let ac(2) then denote the firm’s culture in period 2, i.e., the
action on which the second-generation employees are most likely to agree (at the time they
have to choose their actions), a˜0(1) the action of the first-generation manager, and a˜0(2) the
action of the second-generation manager.
Proposition 7 For any a 6= a˜0(1), P [ac(2) = a˜0(1)] ≥ P [ac(2) = a] and P [a˜0(2) = a˜0(1)] ≥
P [a˜0(2) = a], both with strict inequality when N > 2.
Proof : Given the proof of proposition 6, it suffices to show P [a˜0(2) = a˜0(1)] ≥ P [a˜0(2) = a],
with strict inequality when N > 2. With A the set of actions, M2 the second manager, and ra,0(2)
M2’s prior belief about action a at the start of the game (prior to him having taken action as
employee), condition on the returns {ρa}a∈A, and assume wlog. that a˜0(1) = aN with ρa˜0(1) = x.
To determine the probability that a˜0(2) = aN , note that this can happen in two different ways.
The first possibility is that x is larger than all M2’s remaining prior beliefs, i.e., x ≥ ran,0(2) for
n = 1, . . . , N − 1. In that case, he will undertake aN both as an employee and as a manager. The
second possibility is that x is smaller than one of M2’s remaining prior beliefs, but larger than all
others, and that the true return of that one action is also smaller than x. In that case, M2 will
18See Van den Steen (2004b) for a similar persistence result in a model with strategic experimentation.
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undertake that one action as an employee, then learn that it is actually worse than aN , and then
undertake aN as a manager. The total probability is thus F (x)N−1+(N−1)(1−F (x))F (x)N−2F (x).
The unconditional probability is then
P [a˜0(2) = a˜0(1)] =
∫
F (x)N−1 + (N − 1)(1− F (x))F (x)N−1 dx = 2
N + 1
while P [a˜0(2) = a] =
1−P [a˜0(2)=a˜0(1)]
N−1 so that P [a˜0(2) = a] < P [a˜0(2) = a˜0(1)] iff P [a˜0(2) = a˜0(1)] >
1
N .
The proposition follows. ¥
This result can also be obtained in a general infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model,
in the sense that T generations down the road, two random employees are more likely to
agree on the first manager’s action than on any other action, and the manager in any period
is more likely to undertake a˜0(1) than any other action.
This result is consistent with Baron, Burton, and Hannan (1999), who show that the
founders’ influence on the firm’s behavior persists even after they have left the firm.
5.4 Culture and Performance
Historically, the interest in corporate culture has been driven largely by its suggested impact
on corporate performance. In particular, works such as Deal and Kennedy (1982), Peters
and Waterman (1982), or Collins and Porras (1994) have popularized the notion that strong
culture is a driver of good performance.
The point of this section is to show that the issue of inverse causality looms large when
assessing the relationship between culture and performance. In particular, section 4.3 showed
that high performance will lead to shared beliefs and thus to a strong culture. The ensuing
correlation between culture and performance can easily be mistaken as ‘culture improves
performance’.
Using the same model as in section 4.3, I now show that something similar holds for
employee performance: only employees of homogenous firms will have a high average perfor-
mance, even though homogeneity has itself no performance benefits.
Proposition 8 For any N > 2 and for i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a Rˆ and Hˆ, such that
E[ρa˜i ] ≥ Rˆ if and only if E[H(Z)] ≥ Hˆ.
Proof : Note that the expected performance of Ei as a function of the manager’s payoff x equals
E[ρa˜i ] = qi(x)[xF
N−1(x) + (1− FN−1(x))µF ] + (1− qi(x))x+ (N − 1)µF
N
where µF denotes the expected value of F . This function strictly increases in x when x >
max(µF , xˇ), where xˇ is defined, as before, FN−1(xˇ) = 1N . Given the xˆ of proposition 5, let
ˆˆx = max(xˆ, xˇ, µF ), and let Hˆ now be defined such that
Hˆ =
1
N
+
N
N − 1q(
ˆˆx)(F (ˆˆx)(N−1) − 1
N
)2
and let
Rˆ = qi(ˆˆx)[ˆˆxFN−1(ˆˆx) + (1− FN−1(ˆˆx))µF ] + (1− qi(ˆˆx))
ˆˆx+ (N − 1)µF
N
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Combining this with the proof of proposition 5 implies the proposition. ¥
The intuition is that both homogeneity and employee performance are driven by the perfor-
mance of the manager. This omitted factor then causes a correlation between the two even
though there is no causality in either direction.
Note that, in the model, the employees’ performance lags the measure of homogeneity.
It follows that the approach of Kotter and Heskett (1992) to regress lagged performance on
a measure of cultural strength does not solve this causality issue.
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Figure 2: Performance in function of homogeneity.
Figure 2 shows, for a typical set of parameters, how strong the relation between culture
and employee performance in this model actually is. With such a strong correlation, it is
understandable that people get struck by the strong cultures of extreme performers. It is
then tempting to conclude that culture must be a key to high performance. This inverse
causality issue questions the inferences that can be drawn from simple correlation or regres-
sion analyses, such as these by Kotter and Heskett (1992), and any interpretation of the
relationship between culture and performance that is based on informal observations, such
as Deal and Kennedy (1982).
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that organizations have an innate tendency to develop homogeneity, in the
sense of shared beliefs, through two mechanisms. On the one hand, people prefer to work
with others who have similar beliefs, since such others will make the right decisions. This
leads to sorting. On the other hand, people of the same organization share experiences, which
also leads to shared beliefs. I show that, from an outsider’s perspective, organizations invest
on average too much in homogeneity. I also derive comparative statics on when homogeneity
will be particularly pronounced.
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Since shared beliefs is an important component of corporate culture, I consider what the
implications of this paper are for an economic theory of corporate culture. I show that the
original manager has an important influence on her firm’s culture, and that her influence will
be felt long after she and her original employees have left. I also show that the sometimes
suggested, although never empirically confirmed, correlation between a strong culture and
strong performance may actually be due to the fact that strong performance leads to shared
beliefs, rather than the other way around.
More generally, the paper argues that homogeneity matters, and that economics may
gain from studying such more global characteristics of organizations.
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A A General Homogeneity Result
Let there be J agents who undertake a joint project. In the context of that project, each agent j has to
take an action a˜j ∈ A, with A the action space. The overall payoff of the project is R(a˜1, ..., a˜j , ..., a˜J , x),
where x ∈ X is the true (but unknown) state of the world. I allow A and X to be any space. The true state
x is unknown, but all agents have subjective beliefs about it. These beliefs may differ but are commonly
known, i.e. agents have differing priors. Assume that each agent’s payoff is a fixed share αi of the overall
payoff R(a˜1, ..., a˜j , ..., a˜J , x). The decisions are non-contractible and are taken simultaneously. I also make
the following assumption.
Assumption A1 For any belief by agent i about x, there exists a set of actions that maximize Ei[R]. For
any set of beliefs (by the set of agents) about x, there exists a Nash equilibrium. Players coordinate on a
(subjectively) Pareto-dominant equilibrium whenever one exists.
A sufficient condition for the first part of the assumption is that A is compact and Ei[R] continuous in
the actions. A sufficient condition for the second part is that A is a nonempty compact convex subset of a
Euclidean space, and the Ei[R] are continuous (in all actions) and strictly quasi-concave (in the own action).
Except for the conditions to satisfy this assumption, I impose no assumptions on R.
Proposition A1 Under assumption A1, each agent is (subjectively) better off when all other agents have
beliefs identical to his own, than when some or all other agents hold different beliefs.
Proof : Consider wlog agent 1. Fix any belief for agent 1. Let aˆ = (aˆ1, ...aˆJ ) be a set of actions that
maximize E1[R] under that belief. Consider now first the case that all agents have beliefs that are identical
to that of agent 1. I claim that aˆ = (aˆ1, ...aˆJ) is a (subjectively) Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. That
it is a Nash equilibrium follows from the fact that for aˆ−i given, aˆi maximizes Ei[R] and thus αiEi[R].
Furthermore, if this were not a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, then there existed some equilibrium that gives
everyone a weakly higher payoff and at least one player a strictly higher payoff. This would correspond to a
set of actions that give a strictly higher Ei[R] than aˆ, contradicting the definition of aˆ. It follows that, under
assumption A1, whenever all agents have the same beliefs as agent 1, then the latter’s payoff is E1[R(aˆ)].
But now the proposition follows immediately by the following argument. Fix any set of beliefs for the
other agents. Let aˇ be the actions of any Nash equilibrium that corresponds to this set of beliefs. If
E1[R(aˇ)] > E1[R(aˆ)], then that contradicts the definition of aˆ above. This proves the proposition. ¥
On the one hand, this result is very strong since it says that it is always better to associate with people with
beliefs that are identical to your own. This holds true even if you believe, for example, that experimentation
or diversity of actions is optimal: you simply prefer to associate with people who agree with you on the
optimal form of experimentation or diversity.19
On the other hand, however, the result does not say anything about (local) monotonicity. More specific
assumptions are needed to get monotonicity results.
Note, finally, that the above formulation and result can be adapted to conclude that it is optimal to work
with others with values (i.e., utility functions) that are identical to your own, as long as utility is defined
over social imputations.
B Extensions and Further Results
B.1 Sorting
I extend here the result of section 3. In particular, I will show that organizations invest on average too much
in homogeneity from an outsider’s perspective even when the manager has other ways to control employees’
behavior.
19Note that the result will be different if experimentation must be combined with personal effort. In that
case, you may prefer someone who really believes in that other course of action and thus invests a lot of
personal effort in it.
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To that purpose, assume that in stage 2, the manager can centralize decisions at some cost. In particular,
at cost I, the manager can actually choose (i.e., force) both employees’ decisions. This cost is a random
variable I ∼ U [ 0, 1 ], drawn at the same time as c. Assume for simplicity that C = 1, α1 = α2 = α, and
that F has full support. In this case, homogeneity will reduce the need for centralization. Nevertheless, the
following proposition says that the firm will still invest on average too much in homogeneity.
Proposition B1 For any set of reference beliefs ρˆ = (ρˆX , ρˆY ), γˆ > 1.
Proof : Let mˆ = ρˆX+ρˆY2 and note that sorting and centralization will be mutually exclusive (since both
are costly and attain the same result). M will sort iff I ≥ 4γc and α∆0 ≥ 4γc, and will centralize if 4γc ≥ I
and α∆0 ≥ I.
When α∆0 < 1 and α∆04γ < 1,
E[R] =
∫ α∆0
0
[∫ 1
I
4γ
(mˆ− I) dc
]
dI +
∫ α∆0
4γ
0
[∫ 1
4γc
(mˆ− 4c) dI
]
dc+
∫ 1
α∆0
∫ 1
α∆0
4γ
mˆ dc dI
where the first term is for when M centralizes, the second term when M sorts and the third for when M
does neither. The second term includes immediately the lump-sum payment to compensate for the tax or
subsidy (so that the cost if 4c instead of 4γc). Some algebra gives dE[R]dγ =
(α∆0)
2
12γ3 (3− γα∆0 − 2α∆0) so
that γˆ > 1 in this case.
The same is true when α∆0 ≥ 1, or α∆04γ ≥ 1, or both. For example, if α∆0 ≥ 1 and 4γ > 1,
E[R] =
∫ 1
0
[∫ I
4γ
0
(mˆ− 4c) dc+
∫ 1
I
4γ
(mˆ− I) dc
]
dI
and algebra gives dE[R]dγ =
1
12γ3 (1− γ) so that γˆ = 1. Taking expectations over ∆0 completes the proof. ¥
A fairly straightforward argument also shows that in this model homogenous organizations are more decen-
tralized, i.e., with Cent denoting the event that M centralizes the decisions, P [Cent | H(Z)] decreases in
H(Z).
B.2 Learning
B.2.1 Comparative Statics in the Basic Model
This section considers the comparative statics of two small variations on the learning model of section 4.1.
The first result is that firms with a longer history will be more homogenous, since employees will have
more shared experiences. To study this formally, assume that the first stage gets split in S different stages.
The manager undertakes an action in each of these S stages, each time observing the outcome. All employees
observe all actions and outcomes. In stage S + 1, the employees each undertake an action. The following
proposition then says that homogeneity (measured at the start of stage S + 1) will increase with the length
of the shared history.
Proposition B2 E[H(Z)] increases as S increases.
Proof : Let A denote the full set of actions, and Bs the set of actions that M has tried by the start of
stage s. Condition on (ρa)a∈A, on Bs, and on {ra,0}a∈A (the priors of M). Let the best known action at
the start of stage s be aˆ, with performance ρaˆ. Let k = #(A \ Bs) denote the number of unknown actions,
and let aˇ be a randomly selected action from A \Bs.
I will prove that the probability of two randomly selected agents agreeing increases when the set of known
actions goes from Bs to Bs ∪ aˇ, or the number of unknown actions goes down from k to k − 1. Since the
proposition is trivial when k = 1, I will assume k ≥ 2. With aˆ the best known action, the overall probability
of agreement is F (ρaˆ)2k + 1k
[
1− F (ρaˆ)k
]2 or P (k, F ) = F 2k + 1k [1− F k]2 where F = F (ρaˆ).
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Consider now what happens when a new action aˇ gets tried. If ρaˇ < ρaˆ, then it just is as if one action got
removed from A \ Bs. The probability of agreement is then P ((k − 1), F ) = F 2(k−1) + 1(k−1)
[
1− F (k−1)]2.
If, however, ρaˇ > ρaˆ, then aˇ becomes the new best known action. Denote Fˇ = F (ρaˇ), then the probability
of agreement becomes P ((k − 1), Fˇ ) = Fˇ 2(k−1) + 1(k−1)
[
1− Fˇ (k−1)]2 with Fˇ ≥ F .
Combining these equations implies that we need to show that ∆P = Fˇ 2(k−1) + 1(k−1)
[
1− Fˇ (k−1)]2 −(
F 2k + 1k
[
1− F k]2) ≥ 0 for k ≥ 2, F, Fˇ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] and Fˇ ≥ F . A long algebraic analysis, available from the
author, shows that this indeed holds. ¥
The second result is that, in the original model (with S = 1), homogeneity increases when employees are
more likely to observe the manager’s actions and payoffs. Assume, in particular, that employees only observe
the manager’s action and payoff with (exogenously given) probability q.
Proposition B3 E[H(Z)] increases in q.
Proof : This follows from the fact that E[H(Z)] = 1N + q
N−1
N(2N−1) . ¥
While the result is nearly trivial, it does suggest some useful empirical implications. It suggests, for example,
that shared beliefs will be especially prevalent in small organizations where communication flows easily, in
organizations that involve their employees in decision making, and in firms that invest a lot in socialization
and training.
25
References
Aghion, P., and J. Tirole (1997): “Formal and real authority in organizations,” Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1– 29.
Arvey, R. D., and J. E. Campion (1982): “The Employment Interview: A Summary and Review of Recent Research,” Personnel Psychology, 35,
281– 322.
Baker, E. L. (1980): “Managing Organizational Culture,” Management Review, 69(7), 8– 13.
Baron, J. N., M. D. Burton, and M. T. Hannan (1999): “Engineering Bureaucracy: The Genesis of Formal Policies, Positions, and Structures in
High-Technology Firms,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 1– 41.
Besley, T., and M. Ghatak (2005): “Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents,” American Economic Review, 95(3), 616– 636.
Burns, T., and G. M. Stalker (1961): The Management of Innovation. Londen : Tavistock.
Cable, D. M., and T. A. Judge (1997): “Interviewers’ Perceptions of Person-Organization Fit and Organizational Selection Decisions,” Journal of
Applied Psychology, 82(4), 546– 561.
Carrillo, J. D., and D. Gromb (1999): “On the Strength of Corporate Cultures,” European Economic Review, 43, 1021– 1037.
Chatman, J. A. (1991): “Matching People and Organizations: Selection and Socialization in Public Accounting Firms,” Administrative Science
Quarterly, 36, 459– 484.
Collins, J. C., and J. I. Porras (1994): Built to last : Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. Harper & Row, New York.
Crawford, V., and J. Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, 50, 1431– 1452.
Cre´mer, J. (1993): “Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(3), 351– 386.
Deal, T., and A. A. Kennedy (1982): Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life. Addison Wesley, Reading MA.
Dessein, W. (2002): “Authority and Communication in Organizations,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 811– 838.
Donaldson, G., and J. W. Lorsch (1983): Decision Making at the Top : The Shaping of Strategic Direction. Basic Books, New York.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968): “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, I-III, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of
the Game,” Management Science, 14(7), 486– 502.
Hermalin, B. E. (2001): “Economics and Corporate Culture,” in The International Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate, ed. by C. L.
Cooper, S. Cartwright, and P. C. Earley. John Wiley & Sons, New York, Working paper, University of California-Berkeley.
Judge, T. A., and R. D. Bretz (1992): “Effects of Work Values on Job Choice Decisions,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 261– 271.
Kotter, J. P., and J. L. Heskett (1992): Corporate Culture and Performance. Free Press, New York.
Kreps, D. M. (1990): “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. by J. E. Alt, and K. A. Shepsle,
pp. 90– 143. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lazear, E. P. (1995): “Corporate Culture and Diffusion of Values,” in Trends in Business Organization : Do Participation and Cooperation Increase
Competitiveness, ed. by H. Siebert, pp. 89– 133. J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, Tubingen.
Martin, J. (1992): Cultures in Organizations: Three Perspectives. Oxford University Press, New York.
Meglino, B. M., E. C. Ravlin, and C. L. Adkins (1989): “A Work Values Approach to Corporate Culture: A Field Test of the Value Congruence
Process and its Relationship to Individual Outcomes,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 424– 432.
Morris, S. (1995): “The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory,” Economics and Philosophy, 11, 227– 253.
Peters, T. J., and R. H. Waterman (1982): In Search of Excellence : Lessons from America’s Best-run Companies. Harper & Row, New York.
Prescott, E. C., and M. Visscher (1980): “Organization Capital,” Journal of Political Economy, 88(3), 446– 461.
Rob, R., and P. B. Zemsky (2002): “Social Capital, Corporate Culture and Incentive Intensity,” Rand Journal of Economics, 33(2), 243– 257.
Schein, E. E. (1984): “Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture,” Sloan Management Review, pp. 3– 16.
Schein, E. H. (1985): Organizational Culture and Leadership. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, CA.
Schwartz, H., and S. Davis (1981): “Matching Corporate Culture and Business Strategy,” Organizational Dynamics, pp. 30– 48.
Tirole, J. (1996): “A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality),” Review of
Economic Studies, 63(1), 1– 22.
Van den Steen, E. J. (2001): “Essays on the Managerial Implications of Differing Priors,” PhD Dissertation, Stanford University.
(2004a): “Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity,” Working paper.
(2004b): “On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture),” Working Paper, MIT-Sloan.
(2005a): “Notes on Modelling with Differing or Heterogeneous Priors,” Working Paper, MIT-Sloan.
(2005b): “Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21(1), 256– 283.
Weber, R. A., and C. F. Camerer (2003): “Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach,” Management Science, 49(4), 400–
415, USC Center for Law, Economics, and Organization Research Paper C01-10.
26
